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1of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level
compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production.
MARKETING COOPERATIVES AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE:
A TRANSACTION COSTS PERSPECTIVE
1 Introduction
The depature of this article is the observation that several agricultural and horticultural
marketing cooperatives (MCs) are considering a change or have recently changed their
organizational and financial structure.1 Some MCs are moving in the direction of a
conventional, profit maximizing firm by issuing some kind of equity (i.e. abandoning the one-
member-one-vote feature) and/or are relaxing the uniform treatment of the members.
Zwanenberg et.al. (1992) report about Kerry (1987), Avonmore (1988), Waterford
(1988), and Golden Vale (1992) in Ireland. Examples in the Netherlands are reported by
Campina Melkunie (1991) about the introduction of members’ participation units at
Campina Melkunie in 1991, Zwanenberg (1992) about the stock market listing of
pharmacist cooperative OPG in 1992, NRC Handelsblad (1994) about the introduction of
shares for members at dairy cooperative Friesland Frico Domo in 1994 and the merger and
stock market listing of ten fruits and flowers auctions (Greenery) in 1995.The emergence of
New Generation Cooperatives in the United States of America entails a reorientation of the
activities of MCs in placing demands of consumers for agricultural and horticultural products
at center stage (Cook, 1995).
Two aspects of agricultural and horticultural markets have changed in the course of
time: shortage markets and sufficient internal funds. First, agricultural and horticultural
                                                                
1 This article is concerned with one-product cooperatives. Many cooperatives in Europe and California
are like this. Cooperatives in for example the Midwest of the United States of America are quite different.
2markets have changed from shortage to surplus markets. Folmer et. al. (1995, p.40-41)
measure the extent of shortage markets by calculating self-sufficiency ratios for the European
Union in 1990 of 1.29 for wheat, 1.13 for coarse grains, 1.39 for sugar, .51 for oilseeds,
1.08 for wine, 1.11 for beef, 1.09 for cheese, 1.21 for butter and 1.40 for skimmed milk-
powder. So, many agricultural and horticultural markets are nowadays surplus instead of
shortage markets. These markets require nowadays specific investments in products with
brand names in order to meet the specific demands in the many niches of the market.
Second, the growth of internal resources of financial funds of MCs is smaller than the growth
of the markets they are in (Van Dijk and Poppe, 1992).
This article addresses the organizational and financial implications of these changes
from a transaction costs perspective. Two assets are involved in the evaluation of the MC as
an efficient organizational form. First, the investments made at the farm. A farmer has to
invest in (specific) assets regarding land (fertilizer), labor (effort) and capital (equipment) in
order to increase the likelihood of a good harvest. Second, the processing of the harvest into
final products at the downstream/processing stage of production may also require specific
investments in bringing the produce to value.
An agricultural or horticultural chain of production faces two hold-up problems. First, the
perishability of the harvest puts the relatively small farmer in a weak bargaining position
when a price has to be negotiated with the relatively large company processing the harvest.
The fear of the farmer is that there will be hold-up in the negotiation process. Countervailing
power is needed to eliminate this fear and is created by downstream/forward integration of
many small private entrepreneurs into a MC. Each member of a MC owns and therefore
decides upon assets at two stages of production. The farmer makes his own investment
decisions and owns the resulting assets at his farm (the upstream stage). The ownership of
the assets which are used to process the produce of farmers at the downstream stage is in
the hands of all the members of the MC together. The hold-up problem faced by farmers
has been the driving force behind the emergence of the MC as an organizational form in the
past.
Second, the outside financier of the enterprise processing the produce of the farmer
fears hold-up when it does not have control over how the funds which are made available
will be invested by the management of this enterprise. The corporation or investor-owned
firm in which shareholders are the owner of the enterprise resolves this hold-up problem.
The allocation of control over investment decisions to shareholders gives them confidence
that their money will be spent well. We will refer to a corporation or an investor owned firm
as a conventional firm (CF).
The claim of this article is that a MC is not an efficient organizational form when final
product markets demand differentiated products, requiring sizeable funds for specific
investments at the processing/downstream stage of production. The reason is that farmers
have to decide about investments at the upstream as well as the downstream stage of
production when they are organized in a MC. They choose individually the farm investments
and collectively the non-farm or MC investments. There is a tendency that the optimal
investment decision with respect to bringing the produce to value at the downstream stage
will not be chosen by a MC, because farmers take investment decisions in the MC which
bring farm output and MC output jointly to maximum value. Control over assets is in a CF
assigned to the party whose investment matters most to the value of the relationship in a
situation with a high level of asset specificity, whereas it is not in a MC.
3Section two reviews transaction costs economics with respect to organizational and
financial governance and provides a definition of a CF and a MC which is compatible with
this approach. Section three formulates the hypotheses of the paper. Section four concludes
and indicates topics for future research.
2 Transaction costs economics
Starting point of transaction costs economics is the observation that the complexity of
the real world makes it too costly to describe all relevant contingencies regarding the
exchange ex ante in a contract. Contracts are therefore necessarily incomplete. Williamson
(1985) argues that this causes problems. It causes problems when the parties involved in the
exchange make specific, irreversible (or sunk) investments, i.e. investments which have a
significant higher value within the relationship than in alternative uses.2 This puts the investor
in a weak bargaining position regarding the division of the ex post surplus, because the
incompleteness of contracts prevents that all eventualities are covered ex ante. The investor
anticipates that the other party may take advantage of the incompleteness, i.e. behave
opportunistically by claiming a larger share of the ex post surplus than initially agreed upon,
and decides not to invest in the highest surplus generating project. This is the (inefficient)
hold-up problem (Klein, et al., 1978).
A suitable choice of governance structure mitigates or even eliminates the hold-up
problem. Governance structures are distinguished by the allocation of decision authority and
the identity of the residual claimant. MCs and CFs are considered as two distinct
governance structures. The prime distinguishing feature of a MC is the domination of control
by the input suppliers, i.e. the farmers. They are both suppliers of raw materials and
providers of capital of the MC. Outside shareholders are the residual claimants in a CF and
usually do not supply inputs to the processor. MCs and CFs are expected to react
differently to their environment due to the different assignment of control in unforeseen
contingencies.
Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 address how the various organizational and financial governance
structures deal with the hold-up problem. The analysis is comparative in nature in the sense
that relative differences between different organizational forms (or different financial
instruments) are the focus of analysis. Hypotheses are formulated in terms of ‘discrete
structural alternatives” (Williamson, 1991)3.
                                                                
2 This article employs the asset specificity branch of transaction costs economics. There is substantial
empirical support for this specification (Williamson, 1985). Barzel (1982) advocates a focus on
measurement problems instead of asset specificity, which receives empirical support in Anderson and
Schmittlein (1984). Empirical evidence has to tell whether an asset specificity specification or a
measurement problems specification  as exogenous variables is most suitable in explaining governance
structure changes in agricultural and horticultural markets.
3 The curves of the different governance structures which will be depicted and are to be interpreted as a
“reduced form” of an underlying model (Williamson, 1991). The reduced form is to be seen as a way to
deal with the early stage of development of the theory of the firm (Holmström and Roberts, 1998). The
incomplete contract literature (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)) provides a
systematic treatment of the costs and benefits of different organizational governance structures, which
is extended to different financial governance structures by Aghion and Bolton (1992). The starting point
42.1 Organizational governance
Transaction costs economics argues that ownership structure can be best understood
in terms of the control rights that it confers. The main point of transaction costs economics is
that ex post bargaining positions will depend on the organizational context, i.e. governance
structure. Market governance is advocated when the degree of asset specificity is low,
because it prevents the bureaucratic costs of exchange within a firm. However, exchange in
markets becomes problematic when the level of asset specificity is increasing due to the
increasing prominence of the hold-up problem. Vertical integration gains in attractiveness
because it reduces ex post opportunistic behavior regarding the contract terms by one’s
trading partner by the mechanism of selective intervention. Figure 1 summarizes these
results. The level of asset specificity k is on the horizontal axis and the costs of organizational
governance on the vertical axis. The costs of three governance structures as a function of the
level of asset specificity are depicted. M(k) represents the costs of market governance, H(k)
are the governance costs of a hierarchy (i.e. vertical integration or exchange within a firm)
and X(k) represents the costs of some hybrid organization, like a franchise or a joint
venture. Transaction costs economics poses that the (transaction) costs minimizing
governance structure is chosen. The figure implies that for projects with low levels of asset
specificity exchange via markets is predicted. A hybrid organization is chosen as the mode
of exchange for intermediate levels of asset specificity. Finally, the governance structure
hierarchy is predicted for high levels of asset specificity.
Cost of organi-
zation form
0 k 1 k 2 Asset specificity k
M(k)
X(k)
H(k)
Figure 1: Organizational form and asset specificity (Williamson, 1991)
                                                                                                                                                                                         
of this literature is the assumption of opportunism. Institutional economics (Hodgson, 1998) focusses
on the governance implications of the assumption of bounded rationality.
52.2 Financial governance
Williamson (1988) approaches the choice of financial instruments from the same
perspective as the choice of organizational form. Debt and equity are besides financial
instruments also governance instruments in transaction costs economics. Each financial
instrument specifies certain control rights and how returns depend on outcomes. Debt is
characterized by rigid contract rules, like interest payments at fixed intervals in time, liquidity
tests, pay back requirement at the end of the term, and the creditor has claim priority in the
contingency of bankruptcy. The rigidity of the rules governing debt means that they apply to
all possible contingencies. The attractiveness of this rigidity is that only a few standard
contract rules are considered, which implies that the start-up costs of the design of a debt
contract are low. The disadvantage of having only a few simple rules is that they are often
not well tailored to a particular unforeseen contingency. Their rigidity prevents that efficient
adjustment can not always be made ex post, i.e. debt entails maldaptations to circumstances
which are not envisioned in the design of the contract ex ante. This is especially problematic
when the hold-up problem looms, i.e. a situation in which efficient investment entails a high
level of asset specificity. The implication (of the inability of a few simple rules to respond to
all possible contingencies efficiently) is that the costs of debt rises sharply when the level of
asset specificity increases.
Equity is a governance structure in which financiers are given rights of control. Outside
equity assigns financiers the role of residual claimants in good as well as bad times, there is
no pay back date and a board of directors with extensive power to control the management
is appointed. The variety and flexibility of the control mechanisms available to the board
(e.g. power to replace management, access to internal performance measures, authorize
audits for special follow-up purposes, apprise important investment and operating proposals
before they are implemented), allows it to adjust decisions more efficiently to a variety of
circumstances than the rigid financial governance instrument debt. This board gives financiers
confidence that their resources will be used in their interests and will therefore result in lower
costs of capital than debt in situations with a high level of asset specificity. Equity is more
complex than debt because a variety of control mechanisms has to be developed. The
startup costs of equity are therefore higher than those of debt. The costs of debt as well as
equity show a positive relationship with the level of asset specificity, but the costs of debt
increase faster than the cost of equity, i.e. the attractiveness of outside equity increases
compared to debt when the level of asset specificity increases. The rigid character of rules
associated with debt is responsible for this feature.
Only two financial instruments have been distinguished: debt and equity. There are
also hybrid forms, which have characteristics of both debt and equity, e.g. warrants and
convertible bonds. The costs of these intermediate financial governance structures are also a
function of the degree of asset specificity (Williamson, 1988). Figure 2 summarizes the
above graphically, where D(k) (Y(k), E(k)) is the costs of debt (hybrid finance, equity) as a
function of the level of asset specificity. The prediction is that debt will be used for projects
with a low level of asset specificity (k<k3), whereas equity will be used when the degree of
asset specificity is high (k>k4). Hybrid financial governance structures, Williamson labels
them dequity, are expected for intermediate levels of asset specificity (k3<k<k4).
6Cost of financial
governance
structure
0 k 3 k 4 Asset specificity k
D(k)
Y(k)
E(k)
Figure 2: Financial governance structure and asset specificity
3 MC versus CF
This section identifies the organizational and financial governance differences between
a CF and a MC. The organizational governance differences regarding control and
democratic decision making (3.1) and the financial governance differences (3.2) are related
to the level of asset specificity of the investment at the processing stage of production. These
subsections are put together (3.3) in order to state the main hypothesis in terms of the
second hold-up problem. It will be argued that this hypothesis continues to hold when the
first hold-up problem is also taken into account.
3.1 Organizational governance differences
Internal as well as external control systems serve a role in disciplining decision making
in an organization. A MC seems to be a governance structure which has a well functioning
internal control system. First, input suppliers have a large personal financial stake in the
downstream firm. This provides a credible signal that they will do their job of policing
internal decision making well. Second, the lack of the market for corporate control enhances
the incentives for members in a MC to generate a well functioning internal control system
even further.4 Shares of a MC are not traded in the stock market. Members therefore face
                                                                
4  However, these attractive features of a MC don’t imply that a MC necessarily functions better than a
CF, because its shares are not traded in the stock market. A CF with a listing on the stock market has
commited itself to report regularly and according to certain standards about its state of affairs. Another
attractive feature of the publicly traded CF is that additional external funds can be obtained by issuing
7difficulties in trading their financial stakes. Stockholders can easily get out of a CF by selling
their stock in the market. Members of a MC can not and therefore pay more attention to the
way the MC is being run. Finally, a similar incentive is provided by the lack of a market for
inputs. The absence of a market for inputs eliminates for a MC the possibility of comparing
its own performance with those of rivals. It becomes therefore more attractive to put forth
effort in the internal control system in order to compensate for the absence of the yardstick
of the market. The lack of the market for corporate control and the lack of a market for
inputs provides incentives to participate in the internal control system.
Democratic decision making in a MC encounters some difficulties. First, the process
of opinion- and decisionmaking regarding important policy shifts is more time consuming
than in other organizational forms. This reduces flexibility and creates inertia with respect to
the reaction to changing market circumstances. This problem seems to be increasing when
markets become more complex.5 Second, an increase in the degree of asset specificity (k)
exacerbates the disadvantages a MC has to face. Investments with a higher k entail less
involvement of the members, because they lack the specific knowledge to form an opinion
and give their fiat. Higher outlays are therefore required for a well functioning democratic
process of decision making and the preservation of the “organized trust”. The process of
decisionmaking will also take more time because the degree of complexity probably
increases with a higher level of asset specificity, especially in a globalizing economy. Third, if
k increases without a direct relation with the original activities of the MC (and thereby with
the basic activities of the members), members seem to be less informed regarding the
corresponding value and risks than shareholders of a CF. This causes reluctancy amongst
members to accept that a large part of the surplus will be kept as retained earnings, unless
an acceptable rate of profitability on other investments (including their own farm) will be
realized. Fourth, returns during the membership period have to be at least as high as returns
elsewhere. This limited appropriability problem requires that the internal rate of return on the
assets of MCs must be higher than that of CFs if internally financed investment is to be
chosen when the median membership duration is shorter than the project’s recoupment
period (Bonin, e.a. 1993). MCs using mainly internal funds to finance capital will therefore
underinvest relative to comparable CFs when a member’s individual claim to the returns is
non-transferable. The problem is getting worse due to adverse changes in the demographic
composition of the member population, which will be reflected in the outcome of the
democratic decision making process (Hart and Moore, 1994). The average age of the
members is increasing due to declining entry of new, young members.
However, there are at least five forces pointing in another direction. First, democrating
decision making is likely to generate a merging of opinions along the lines of the Blackwell
and Dubins’ (1962) result. Second, democratic decision making is less vulnerable to
successful politicking because bad proposals are winnowed out (Tullock, 1992). Third,
democratic decision making may be second-best when the preferences of the pivotal voter
are close to those of the average voter (Hart and Moore, 1994). Fourth, the costs of the
more cumbersome decision making process in a MC may be compensated for by improved
decision making (Hendrikse, 1998). Finally, the huge financial involvement of the financiers
                                                                                                                                                                                         
new shares, whereas a MC often has to go thru cumbersome negotiations with the providers of external
funds.
5  An advantage of a slow, democratic process with conservative voters may be that the approval of a
policy decision will be carried out fast and with a lot of support.
8in the success of the cooperative is in general a strong commitment to acquire substantial
information in order to evaluate policy decisions.
A MC and a CF are two different governance structures. They are both an example
of hierarchial governance in terms of figure 1, because there is one party having the residual
control rights in all possible unforeseen circumstances.6 Figure 2 summarizes the above
account of the differences between MCs and CFs with the level of asset specificity at the
processing stage of production on the horizontal axis.. A hierarchy is a cost minimizing
governance structure in figure 1 when the degree of asset specificity of investments is higher
than k2. MCs and CFs are examples of hierarchies and have therefore to be analysed in this
domain. The H(k)-curve of a MC is below (above) the H(k)-curve of a CF when the
advantages of a MC outweigh (are smaller than) the disadvantages. The observations in this
section imply that the H(k)-curve of a MC is steeper than an H(k)-curve of a CF, i.e. the
intense monitoring by the farmers of investment decisions is an attractive feature of a MC,
but it decreases in effectiveness when the specificity of investments is increasing.
Cost of organizational 
governance 
structure
0 k 2 k 5 Asset specificity k
H    (k)
MC
H    (k)
CF
Figure 3: Marketing cooperatives versus conventional firms
Figure 3 reflects a situation in which a MC may be an efficient governance structure.
The conclusion is that MCs may be a viable organizational form for intermediate levels of
asset specificity, i.e. k2 < k < k5. (A MC will not emerge or disappear when the costs of its
governance structure are higher than those of a CF for every value of k higher than k2, i.e. k2
> k5.). Figure 3 also indicates that the members of MC have some leeway to advance their
interests as input suppliers when k2 < k5. The superior functioning internal control system of
the MC allows either the input suppliers to advance an input price which is above the market
price, or not to provide the efficient level of attention in the internal control system, or slack,
or increase the financial reserves of the MC. However, the extent to which these activities
are allowed by the market depends on the level of asset specificity.
                                                                
6  Two other examples of hierarchial governance are a purchasing cooperative and a labor managed firm.
A purchasing cooperative is a governance structure where a specific group of customers is the residual
claimant. Employees have decision authority in unforeseen contingencies in a labor managed firm.
93.2 Financial governance differences
The composition of the financial structure is influenced in two ways by the choice of
governance. First, a MC receives better terms on debt than a CF. There are several reasons
why k3  in figure 2 of a MC will be higher than the k3 of a CF. First, each farmer will have a
sizeable share of his crop processed by a particular MC. They have therefore a large
financial stake in the MC. Second, financial funds are generated internally in a MC by
retained earnings. Farmers decide about the input price the cooperative is paying. They may
decide that this price is lower than the market price in order to add the difference to the
retained earnings. This gives providers of debt the confidence that the terms of the contract
will be met. It turns out that they provide debt without any liability of the farmers when they
have generated a high level of inside equity. Third, equity shares of a CF can at every instant
of time be traded in the stock market, i.e. they are transferable. Members of a MC often do
not have individual and transferable ownership rights in the assets of the MC. This “money in
the dead hand” provides a commitment that the debt contract will be honored.  Fourth, the
previous section has formulated various reasons why a MC may have a superior internal
control system. These features of a MC imply that the D(k)-curve of a MC will be below
the D(k)-curve of a CF.
Second, outside equity is more expensive for a MC than a CF, because the feature
that farmers are by definition the residual claimants in a MC prevents that the providers of
these funds have much to say about how their money is spent. Member control implies that
farmers choose the investments of a MC. This is problematic regarding the terms at which
outside equity is made available for specific (downstream) investments, because members
select investment projects which bring farm output and MC output jointly to maximum value.
Outside providers of equity have to fear that their funds in a MC are not put to optimal use
in terms of return on investment. They will reflect this in asking a premium for relinquishing
control. A CF does not face this problem because providers of equity decide themselves
how their money will be spend in order to add value to the harvest. One of the stylized facts
of a MC is that a significant amount of inside equity is provided by keeping a considerable
share of the profits as retained earnings each year. This is often seen as a major advantage
of the MC, because it provides an inexpensive source of funds. However, it also has a
disadvantage in the sense that it is a governance structure which is more “forgiving” than
debt (Williamson, 1988). Inside equity provides weaker incentives than debt to perform
well. These observations imply that the E(k)-curve of a MC will be above the E(k)-curve of
a CF. The value of k4 in figure 2 will therefore be higher for a MC than for a CF. This
implies that there are values of k for which a CF will use outside equity, whereas it is
efficient for a MC to use other financial instruments. The nature of these other financial
instruments depends on the value of k compared to k3. Debt will be used when k £ k3,
whereas a hybrid form of finance will be used when k > k3.
Figure 4 summarizes the above observations by extending figure 2. The cost
minimizing financial governance structure is drawn for a MC as well as a CF as a function of
the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production.7
                                                                
7  It is assumed that the Y(k)-curve is the same for both governance structures. This is done in order to
prevent that the analysis becomes unnecessarily complex. We are only claiming that there are hybrid
forms of finance. This is not enough in order to formulate a statement about a difference between an
10
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Figure 4: Financial instruments as a function of governance structure
Our conclusion regarding the financial structure of Mcs and Cfs are summarized by
k < k3
cf : MCs and CFs use debt
k Î [ k3
cf  , k3
mc  ] : MCs use debt
  CFs use hybrid form of finance when k < k 4
cf
equity when k > k 4
cf
k Î [ k3
mc , k 4
mc ] : MCs and CFs use hybrid form of finance
k Î [k 4
cf , k 4
mc ] : MCs use hybrid form of finance when k > k3
mc
debt when k < k3
mc
CFs uses equity
k > k 4
mc  : MCs and CFs use equity
A testable hypothesis which follows immediately from these results is that the leverage of a
MC is at least as high as the leverage of a CF, given the level of k.
3.3 Hypotheses
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Ymc (k)-curve and an Ycf (k)-curve. However, our main claim holds regardless the formulation of such a
statement because the intercept and slope of a hybrid form of finance is in between the debt and equity
curve. It is therefore assumed for convenience that Ymc (k) = Ycf (k). Our main claim will hold even when
hybrid forms of finance are left out of the analysis completely. Hybrid forms are nonetheless included in
order to stay in line with Williamson (1988).
11
The relationship between the choice of an efficient governance structure,
organizational as well as financial, and the level of asset specificity of a MC as well as a CF
has been established. Enterprises have to be evaluated on all dimensions jointly in order to
formulate hypotheses about their performance. This may give rise to many different
aggregation issues. However, this problem is circumvented here because the organizational
and financial choice of governance point in the same direction when the level of asset
specificity increases. If the level of asset specificity increases, then the CF does not lose in
attractiveness. Figure 3 illustrates this regarding organizational governance and figure 4
shows this with respect to financial governance. The main hypothesis which is implied by
these observations is that an enterprise will not switch from a MC to a CF when the level of
asset specificity is increasing, i.e. a MC diminishes in attractiveness compared to a CF when
the efficient level of asset specificity (of investments at the processing stage of production) is
increasing.
The above has also implications for the viability of the MC in different countries.
Important financial governance differences regarding equity between the USA and the
Netherlands are the limited rights of shareholders and the virtual non-existence of the market
for corporate control (due to the extensive use of anti- takeover measures) in the Dutch
setting (Boot, 1994). The providers of equity are the owners of the CF in the USA, whereas
all kinds of restrictions are imposed by the Dutch law on the rights of outside financiers.
Outside equity holders in the Netherlands receive a standard dividend, whereas the
remaining part of profits may go to employees and slack. Equity does hardly carry any
control rights for the shareholders and therefore doesn’t differ much from debt. This implies
that the value of k4 is larger in the Netherlands than in the USA, because the E(k)-curve is
almost the same as the D(k)-curve in the former country.8
There are three important organizational governance differences between CFs and
MCs regarding the Board of Directors in the Netherlands. MCs don’t transfer the ultimate
approval of the annual account to the Board of Directors. Secondly, they also don’t leave
the right of appointing members of the Board of Directors to the Board of Directors itself.9
The General Assembly takes care of these tasks. Finally, the Dutch law on cooperatives
secures member control because it allows that up to two thirds of the members of the Board
of Directors are appointed by the General Assembly of a MC.10 (The workers council has
veto power regarding the composition of the final third.) These institutional differences make
                                                                
8  This is relected in the empirical evidence. Stock price/earnings ratios in Amsterdam are by far the
lowest in Europe (Bennis and Van Leeuwen, 1992). New stock is issued at 24 times the annual profits in
the United States of America, whereas it is only 12 times the annual profits in the Netherlands. These
institutional features suggest that Dutch firms have on average a higher debt/equity ratio than
American firms, which is supported by Remonola (1990).
9  A board of directors in large CF in the Dutch setting is an in-group which selects its own successors
(principle of cooptation). Shareholders can only by majority vote not accept a candidate. They have no
active rights to appoint one or, in many cases, even to propose one.
10  There are also differences between Anglo-Saxon (e.g. American) and Germanic (e.g. Dutch) board of
directors (Moerland, 1995). Anglo-Saxon Boards of Directors have a one-tier system, in which executive
managers and outside experts are represented. Boards of Directors in Germanic countries have a two-tier
board system, consisting of an executive board and a supervisory board. (The law specifies certain
requirements regarding employee representatives in the supervisory board). Insiders and outsiders have
been separated in a two-tier system. However, the principle of cooptation in the executive board in The
Netherlands seems to offset the advantages of the two-tier system regarding the effectiveness of the
executive board (Boot, 1994).
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it more likely that k5 is larger in the Netherlands than in the USA. The virtual absence of the
market for corporate control is worse for CFs than MCs in the Netherlands, because the
member control feature of MCs doesn’t allow much influence of this disciplinary mechanism
anyway. This reinforces the hypothesis that value of k5 will be higher in the Netherlands.
The hypothesis which follows from these comparative statics observations is that MCs
are predicted to be viable for a larger range of the level of asset specificity in the
Netherlands than in the USA. The financial governance difference, i.e. a higher value of k4 in
the Netherlands than in the USA, implies that the disadvantages of outside equity finance of
a MC compared to a CF emerge at a higher level of asset specificity in the Netherlands than
in the USA. The organizational governance difference, i.e. a higher level of k5 in the
Netherlands than in the USA,  implies that it is more likely that there is a range of levels of
asset specificity higher than k2 in which a MC is more efficient than a CF, i.e. the attractive
organizational governance of a MC more than offsets the financial governance
disadvantages.
This section has focussed on the investment problems regarding the processor. There
is also the hold-up problem regarding the farm investments. However, the results of our
analysis do not change when this hold-up problem is included in the analysis. Our claims
regarding the level of asset specificity of the investments at the processor are formulated
relative to the hold-up problem regarding farm investments. So, a statement in this
subsection like the efficient level of asset specificity has increased can be interpreted as the
efficient level of asset specificity of the investments at the processor has increased relative to
the efficient level of asset specificity of the farm. Grossman and Hart (1986) have analysed a
situation with two hold-up problems. Figure 5 presents the equilibrium investment levels for
different governance structures. Point MC reflects the investment levels when a MC is
chosen. The level of asset specificity of farm investments is high, but the level of asset
specificity of investments at the processor is low. The reverse holds in point CF where a CF
is chosen. The main result of the Grossman and Hart analysis (1986, p. 708) is that “Firm 1
control will be desirable when firm 1’s ex ante investment is much more important than firm
2’s (so that firm 2’s underinvestment under firm 1 control is relatively unimportant) and when
overinvestment by firm 1 under firm 1 control is a less severe problem than underinvestment
by firm 1’ and ¢nonintegration is desirable if the two investments are both important in some
sense, so that it is preferable to have both of them at a medium level than to have one very
high and the other very low as under integration’. The claim of this article is that
circumstances have changed such that the efficient level of asset specificity of investments at
the processor has increased relative to the efficient level of asset specificity of investments at
the farm.11 12 This implies that efficiency of governance structure choice requires a change
from a MC to CF.
                                                                
11 American Crystal Sugar seems to be an example of where a CF was converted to a MC. Red River
Valley Sugar Beet Growers Association acquired the CF American Crystal Sugar in 1973. Volkin and
Bradford (1975) write that ¢What grower association leaders really feared was the possibility that
American Crystal would close one or more of its four plants in Minnesota and North Dakota. This
concern was supported by observations that ¢factory upkeep was not being maintained for most
efficient operations’ and ¢Steps had to be taken to protect growers’ long-term sugar beet production
patterns, which had meant so much to their livelihood’. The change at American Crystal Sugar does not
undermine our theory because it provides an example of increasing importance of the first hold-up
problem, without making any references to the final product market. If the first hold-up problem becomes
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Figure 5: Investment levels and governance structures
4 Conclusion and further research
This article has investigated some aspects of the MC from a transaction costs
economics perspective. A MC and a CF are both considered as a hierarchial governance
structure. The main difference between these governance structures is that the input suppliers
have the formal authority regarding investment decisions in a MC, whereas outside equity
holders have this right in a CF.
A governance structure has to address two hold-up problems in an agricultural or
horticultural chain of production. First, it has to prevent post-harvest hold-ups of perishable
farm products. Second, it has to get attractive terms on outside funds for its investments.
The countervailing power feature of a MC resolves the first problem. The second problem is
not material when the investments of a MC are not specific, which is the case in markets
characterized by homogeneous products. However, a MC is not able to resolve both
problems in differentiated product markets, which require investments with a high level of
asset specificity at the processing stage of production, e.g. brand names. The attractiveness
of a MC decreases with respect to choosing efficient investment levels because democratic
decision making becomes more problematic and members will also take considerations
regarding return on farm investments into account when this decision is made. This is also
problematic from a financial governance perspective, because the terms at which financial
funds are made available by outsiders are worse than those faced by a CF when the level of
asset specificity is high. The requirement of domination of control by the member of a MC is
responsible for this disadvantage. It reinforces the claim about the viability of the MC as a
                                                                                                                                                                                         
more important and the second does not, then our theory predicts that switches from a CF to an MC are
to be expected.
12  A referee indicated that the perishability of crops is nowadays not as much a problem anymore due to
technological developments. This observation strengthens our claim, because it suggests that the first
hold-up problem has diminished in importance compared to the second hold-up.
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function of the level of asset specificity. The resolution of the second problem requires a
switch from a MC to a CF. These arguments result in the main hypothesis of the paper that
an increase in the extent of asset specificity will never be accompanied by a switch from a
CF to a MC.
An important topic for future research is to investigate the possibilities regarding the
design of an organizational structure and financial instruments which on the one hand
maintain the special MC character and on the other hand eliminate the inefficiencies
associated with this organizational form. Most solutions which are nowadays considered
within the MC structure consist of some differentiation in the financial terms being offered to
members. Examples are preference shares and quantum discounts. They take account of the
variety between the members.  However, this does not solve the second hold-up problem.
A MC has to solve two hold-up problems, which is asking too much. An additional degree
of freedom has to be created. The introduction of other organizational arrangements
(association, participation company) may resolve the lack of countervailing power when the
MC is abandoned.
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